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Abstract
This study presents an overlapping generations model to capture the nature of
the competition between generations regarding two redistribution policies, public
education and public pensions. From a political economy viewpoint, we investigate
the e¤ects of population aging on these policies and economic growth. We show that
greater longevity results in a higher pension-to-GDP ratio. However, an increase in
longevity produces an initial increase followed by a decrease in the public education-
to-GDP ratio. This, in turn, results in a hump-shaped pattern of the growth rate.
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1 Introduction
Redistribution policy preferences are dictated largely by age. Middle-aged workers who
are parents have altruistic concern for their children and are more likely to support public
education because they can benet from highly educated children. This makes expen-
diture on education more attractive for these parents. On the other hand, retired old
people are less likely to support public education because they cannot obtain the benets
of education directly. Instead, they support public pension expenditure that compensates
for loss of earnings in their retirement. The age-dependent di¤erence in policy preferences
suggests that the recent trend of aging in developed countries, which increases the po-
litical power of the old, may induce governments to shift expenditure from education to
pensions.
This prediction on pensions is in line with the observation in developed countries.
Figure 1 suggests that the public pension spending-to-GDP ratio is positively correlated
with the share of the population aged 65 years and above. However, the aforemen-
tioned prediction on public education does not t the observation: the public education
spending-to-GDP ratio shows a hump-shaped pattern in response to the share of the aged
population. In addition, the growth rate shows a hump-shaped pattern, which seems
to be induced by the hump-shaped public education spending pattern. Therefore, there
should be another mechanism for the non-linear relationship between aging and public
education. The aim of this study to present a political economy model that provides the
prediction tting the observation in Figure 1.
[Figure 1 here.]
For analysis, this study presents a politico-economic model to characterize the nature
of the competition between generations, and in addition, examines the e¤ect of population
aging on redistribution policy and economic growth. To capture generational conict, the
model economy contains an innite sequence of overlapping generations in which each
is comprised of many identical individuals who live over three periods, namely, young,
middle, and old ages. The middle-aged individuals are faced with uncertain lifetimes and
are endowed with altruism toward children (i.e., the young). The middle-aged and old in-
dividuals participate in voting, but policy disagreements between them arise owing to the
longer planning horizon of the middle-aged individuals. In addition, the model contains
physical and human capital accumulation through savings and educational investment,
which enables us to demonstrate the e¤ect of redistribution policy on economic growth.
Within this framework, we consider probabilistic voting a la Lindbeck and Weibull
(1987). In each period, the middle-aged and old individuals participate in voting; the
young are not enfranchised. The government in power maximizes a political objective
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function of the weighted sum of the utilities of the middle-aged and old population, taking
account of the impact on the middle-aged populations economic decisions (for applications
of the probabilistic voting for overlapping-generations models, see, e.g., Grossman and
Helpman, 1998; Hassler et al., 2005; and Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti, 2012).
In this voting environment, the redistribution preferences of the middle-aged popu-
lation are state dependent. In other words, successive generations are linked through
physical and human capital accumulation. The state dependence of policy preferences
gives the middle-aged voters the means to inuence the policy outcome when they are
old. Their incentive to manipulate policy preferences stems from their desire to obtain
large pension benets in old age. We capture this forward-looking behavior of the middle-
aged voters by focusing on Markov-perfect political equilibria, in which voters condition
their strategies on payo¤-relevant state variables (i.e., physical and human capital in the
present model).
The Markov-perfect political equilibrium is a¤ected by the three factors representing
population aging: uncertain lifetimes capturing individual longevity, the political power of
the old that reects their share in voting, and the population growth rate. The political
power of the old and the population growth rate have denite e¤ects on pensions and
education. With greater political power of the old and a lower population growth rate,
the pension-to-GDP ratio increases, but the education-to-GDP ratio decreases. In other
words, population aging stemming from a larger share of the old in voting and a lower
population growth rate shifts the allocation of tax revenue from education for the young
to pensions for the old.
In addition, longevity has a denite e¤ect on pensions; greater longevity results in
a higher pension-to-GDP ratio. However, the e¤ect of longevity on public education is
not straightforward. Greater longevity implies a larger weight on the utility of the old
and the utility of the middle-aged population for their consumption in old age. This
incentivizes the government to shift its spending from education to pensions to improve
their utility. However, at the same time, greater longevity incentivizes the government
to shift the allocation of spending from pensions to education because greater longevity
implies a larger weight of middle-aged votersaltruistic utility from the human capital of
their children. These opposing e¤ects produce an initial increase followed by a decrease
in the education-to-GDP ratio and this, in turn, results in a hump-shaped pattern of the
growth rate. The model predictions described thus far are in line with the observations
of developed countries demonstrated in Figure 1.
We obtain our results by assuming perfect annuity markets where individuals can pur-
chase private pensions. However, in the real world, some countries have limited or no
access to private annuity markets. To account for this possibility, we consider an alterna-
tive case without an annuity market, and show that the growth rate increases with rising
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longevity. This result reects data from some Eastern European countries, such as Czech
Republic, Estonia, and Hungary, with low degrees of private annuitization (OECD, 2014),
as demonstrated in Panel (c) of Figure 1. Therefore, we may well conclude that the over-
all trend in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries
shows a non-linear relationship between longevity and growth, but some countries show
a positive relationship due to limited access to private annuities.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We rst present a literature review
in Subsection 1.1. Thereafter, Section 2 presents the model and characterizes economic
equilibrium. Section 3 describes political equilibrium. Section 4 investigates how the
three aging factors a¤ect government expenditure on education and pensions. Section 5
analyzes the e¤ects of the aging factors on economic growth. Section 6 undertakes the
analysis under an alternative scenario where annuity markets are absent, and compares
the result here to that in Section 5. Section 7 provides concluding remarks.
1.1 Literature Review
The present study is related to the literature on the political economy of public education
and pensions by Bearse, Glomm, and Janeba (2001), Soares (2006), Iturbe-Ormaetxe and
Valera (2012), Kaganovich and Meier (2012), Kaganovich and Zilcha (2012), and Naito
(2012). A common feature of these studies is that the two-dimensional voting aspect
is reduced to one dimension for simplicity of analysis. In other words, they consider
a vote over public education for a given pension benet, or a vote over the allocation
of tax revenue for a given tax rate. Therefore, these studies do not indicate how the
size of the government (i.e., the tax rate) and the allocation of government spending
between education and pensions are determined jointly through voting in the presence of
generational conict.1
This problem is resolved by introducing two-dimensional voting (Rangel, 2003; Levy,
2005; Poutvaara, 2006; and Arawatari and Ono, 2014). However, these studies abstract
from physical and/or human capital formation, and thus, show nothing about the inter-
action between policy and capital formation. Capital formation is introduced by Kemnitz
(2000), Gradstein and Kaganovich (2004), Holz-Eakin, Lovely, and Tosun (2004), Tosun
(2008), and Bernasconi and Profeta (2012). These studies assume myopic voting, in which
the current voters take future policy as given. In other words, the forward-looking deci-
sions of voters are absent in the analysis of these studies. Therefore, they abstract from the
feedback mechanism between current and future redistribution policies through physical
and/or human capital accumulation, which plays a crucial role in shaping redistribution
1An alternative to the political economy approach is the normative approach (e.g., Boldrin and Montes,
2005), which takes the two spending programs as given and focuses on their role as a means to support
the complete market allocation.
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policies.
The feedback mechanism is demonstrated by Beauchemin (1998), Forni (2005), Bas-
setto (2008), Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2008, 2012), Song (2011), Bishnu and Wang
(2014), Chen and Song (2014), and Ono (2015). In particular, the present study is closely
related to Lancia and Russo (2015), who analyze the politics of public education and
pensions in overlapping generations models. Lancia and Russo (2015) show that greater
political power of the old in voting increases pension spending but decreases education
spending. However, the cross-country evidence shows that the education-to-GDP ratio
shows a hump-shaped pattern in response to the share of the old in the population (see
Figure 1). The present study shows that altruism toward children and uncertain lifetimes,
which are absent in the model of Lancia and Russo (2015), are the keys to demonstrate
such a hump-shaped pattern of education spending. In addition, this pattern induces
a non-linear relationship between aging and economic growth, which is in line with the
empirical evidence (e.g., An and Jeon, 2006; Kunze, 2014; and Panel (c) in Figure 1).
Ludwig, Schelkle, and Vogel (2012) and Heer and Irmen (2014) also show the potential
for a non-linear relationship. An aging population decreases the share of the working-age
population, which in turn increases the capital-labor ratio, lowers the rates of return on
capital, and thus creates a disincentive to save. Endogenous human capital adjustment
(Ludwig, Schelkle, and Vogel, 2012) or rmsincentive to invest in innovation that a¤ect
total factor productivity (Heer and Irmen, 2014) could mitigate this negative impact .
The present study instead focuses on the political power of the elderly that a¤ects growth
rates through their inuence on public education and pension policies.
Apart from the abovementioned studies, the present study is related to Lambrecht,
Michel, and Vidal (2005) and Kunze (2014), who investigate the growth e¤ect of redistri-
bution policy in overlapping generations models, in which altruistic parents nance the
education of their children. However, both of these studies focus on a single policy issue:
public pensions in the case of Lambrecht, Michel, and Vidal (2005), and public education
in the case of Kunze (2014). The present study di¤ers from theirs in that we consider
the two policy issues, investigate how they are shaped by population aging, and in turn,
analyze how they a¤ect economic growth.
2 Model
The model is based on that presented by Lambrecht, Michel, and Vidal (2005) and Kunze
(2014). The economy starts at period 0 and consists of overlapping generations. Indi-
viduals are identical within a generation, live at most for three periods, namely, young,
middle, and old ages. Each middle-aged individual gives birth to 1 + n children. The
middle-aged population for the period-t is Nt, and the population grows at a constant
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rate n(>  1) : Nt+1 = (1 + n)Nt.
Individuals are faced with uncertain lifetimes in the third period of life. The probability
of living in old age is  2 [0; 1]. This is idiosyncratic for all individuals and is constant
across periods.
2.1 Individuals
The economic behavior of individuals over their life cycles is as follows. During young
age, individuals make no economic decisions; they receive public education nanced by
the government. In middle age, individuals work, receive market wages, and make tax
payments. They use after-tax income for consumption and savings. In old age, individuals
are retired. They receive the returns from savings and pension benets, and consume both.
Consider an individual born in period t   1. In period t, he is middle aged and is
endowed with ht units of human capital. He supplies it inelastically in the labor market,
and obtains the wage wtht, where wt is the wage rate per e¢ ciency unit of labor in
period-t. After paying the tax twtht where t 2 (0; 1) is the period-t income tax rate,
the individual distributes his after-tax income into consumption, ct, and savings held as
an annuity and invested in physical capital, st. Therefore, the period-t budget constraint
for the middle becomes as follows:
ct + st  (1  t)wtht:
The period-t+ 1 budget constraint in old age is
dt+1  Rt+1

st + pt+1;
where dt+1 is consumption in old age, Rt+1(> 0) is the gross return from investment
in capital, Rt+1st= is the return from savings, and pt+1 is the pension benet. If an
individual dies at the end of the middle age, his annuitized wealth is transferred to the
individuals who live throughout old age via annuity markets. Therefore, the return from
saving becomes Rt+1= under the assumption of perfect annuity markets. The case of no
annuity market will be investigated in Section 6.
A period-t middle-aged individual cares about his childrens per capita human capital
in period t+ 1; ht+1. This is a function of the government spending on public education,
xt, and the parents human capital, ht. In particular, ht+1 is formulated by the following
equation:
ht+1 = D (xt)
 (ht)
1  ;
whereD(> 0) is a scale factor, and  2 (0; 1) denotes the elasticity of education technology
with respect to public education spending.
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It should be noted that private investment in education may also contribute to the for-
mation of human capital. For example, parentstime (Glomm and Ravikumar, 1995, 2001,
2003; Glomm and Kaganovich, 2008) or spending (Glomm, 2004; Lambrecht, Michel, and
Vidal, 2005; Kunze, 2014) devoted to education may work as a complement to public
education. In the present study, we abstract private education from the analysis to sim-
plify the presentation of the model and to focus on the conict between generations with
respect to public spending on education and pensions. In a former version of this paper
(Ono and Uchida, 2014), we assume private education spending as a complement to public
education, and obtain qualitatively similar results to those in the present version of the
paper.
We assume that parents are altruistic toward their children and are concerned about
the disposable income of their children in middle age, (1  t+1)wt+1ht+1. The preferences
of an individual born in period t 1 are specied by the following expected utility function
of the logarithmic form:
Ut = ln ct +  ln dt+1 +  ln(1  t+1)wt+1ht+1;
where (> 0) denotes the intergenerational degree of altruism. We substitute the budget
constraints and human capital production function into the utility function to write the
following unconstrained maximization problem:
max
fstg
ln [(1  t)wtht   st] +  ln

Rt+1

st + pt+1

+  ln(1  t+1)wt+1D (xt) (ht)1  :
By solving the problem, we obtain the following savings and consumption functions:
st =

1 + 


(1  t)wtht   pt+1
Rt+1

; (1)
ct =
1
1 + 


(1  t)wtht + pt+1
Rt+1

: (2)
The savings function in (1) states that a higher level of after-tax wage, (1  t)wt, implies
higher savings, whereas a higher level of pension, pt+1, implies lower savings. The con-
sumption function in (2) states that a higher lifetime income, (1  t)wtht + pt+1=Rt+1,
results in larger spending on consumption.
2.2 Firms
In each period, there is a continuum of identical rms that are perfectly competitive prot
maximizers. According to CobbDouglas technology, they produce a nal good Yt using
two inputs, aggregate physical capital Kt and aggregate human capital Ht  Ntht. The
aggregate output is given by
Yt = A (Kt)
 (Ht)
1  ,
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where A(> 0) is a scale parameter and  2 (0; 1) denotes the capital share.
Let kt  Kt=Ht denote the ratio of physical to human capital. The rst-order condi-
tions for prot maximization with respect to Ht and Kt are as follows:
wt = (1  )A (kt) ; (3)
t = A (kt)
 1 ; (4)
where wt and t are the wage of labor and the rental price of capital, respectively. The
conditions state that rms hire human and physical capital until the marginal products
are equal to the factor prices.
2.3 Government Budget Constraint
Pensions and public education are nanced by the tax on labor income. The aggregate
tax revenue is twthtNt, while the aggregate expenditure is the spending on public pen-
sions, Nt 1pt, plus the spending on public education, Nt+1xt. Therefore, the government
budget constraint in period t is

1 + n
pt + (1 + n)xt = twtht:
The left-hand side shows the expenditure on pensions, pt=(1+n), and public education,
(1 + n)xt, and the right-hand side shows the revenue from taxing labor income.
2.4 Economic Equilibrium
The market clearing condition for capital is Kt+1 = Ntst, which expresses the equality of
total savings by the middle-aged population in period t; Ntst, to the stock of aggregate
physical capital at the beginning of period t+1, Kt+1. With the use of kt+1  Kt+1=Ht+1
and ht+1 = Ht+1=Nt+1, we can rewrite the condition as (Kt+1=Ht+1)  (Ht+1=Nt+1) 
(Nt+1=Nt) = st; or
(1 + n)kt+1ht+1 = st:
The economic equilibrium in the present model is dened as follows.
Denition 1. Given a sequence of policies, ft; xt; ptg1t=0, an economic equilibrium is a
sequence of allocations fct; dt; st; kt+1; ht+1g1t=0 and prices ft; wt; Rtg1t=0 with the ini-
tial conditions k0(> 0) and h0(> 0) such that (i) given (wt; Rt+1; t; xt; pt+1) ;
 
cyt ; c
o
t+1; st

solves the utility maximization problem; (ii) given (wt; t), kt solves the prot max-
imization problem of a rm; (iii) given (wt; ht; kt) ; (t; xt; pt) satises the govern-
ment budget constraint; (iv) t = Rt holds; and (v) the capital market clears:
(1 + n)kt+1ht+1 = st.
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In economic equilibrium, the indirect utility function of the middle-aged population
in period t; V Mt , and that of the old in period t, V
o
t , can be expressed as functions of
government policy and physical and human capital as follows:
V M (kt; ht; t; kt+1; ht+1; t+1; pt+1) = ln
1
1 + 

(1  t)(1  )A (kt) ht + pt+1
A (kt+1)
 1

+  ln
 
A (kt+1)
 1

(1 + n)kt+1ht+1 + pt+1
!
+  ln(1  t+1)(1  )A (kt+1) ht+1; (5)
V o (kt; ht; t; pt) = ln
 
A (kt)
 1

(1 + n)ktht + pt
!
+  ln(1  t)(1  )A (kt) ht; (6)
where some irrelevant terms are omitted from the expressions. The rst and second terms
in (5) correspond to the utility of consumption in middle and old ages, respectively, and
the third term shows the utility from the disposable income of their children. The rst
term in (6) corresponds to the utility of old-age consumption and the second term shows
the utility from the disposable income of their children.
3 Political Equilibrium
The present study assumes probabilistic voting developed by Lindbeck andWeibull (1987)
for demonstrating the political mechanism. In each period, the government in power
maximizes a political objective. Formally, the political objective function in period t is
given by

t = !V
o (kt; ht; t; pt) + (1 + n)V
M (kt; ht; t; kt+1; ht+1; t+1; pt+1) ;
where !(> 0) and 1 + n are the relative weights of old-age and middle-age agents,
respectively. In particular, the parameter !(> 0) represents the political power of the
old-age agents. An explicit microfoundation for this modeling is explained in Persson
and Tabellini (2000, Chapter 3) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2005, Appendix). The
government problem in period t is to maximize 
t subject to the government budget
constraint, given the state variables, kt and ht.
In this study, we restrict our attention to a Markov-perfect equilibrium. In the present
framework, Markov perfectness implies that outcomes depend only on the payo¤-relevant
state variables, that is, physical and human capital, k and h, respectively. Therefore, the
expected levels of tax and public pension for the next period, t+1 and pt+1, are given by
functions of the next period stock of physical and human capital, t+1 = T (kt+1; ht+1) and
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pt+1 = P (kt+1; ht+1), respectively. By using recursive notation with z0 denoting the next
period z, we can dene a Markov-perfect political equilibrium as follows.
Denition 2.
A Markov-perfect political equilibrium is a set of functions, hT;X; P i, where T :
<++  <++ ! [0; 1] is a tax rule,  = T (k; h), X : <++  <++ ! <++ is a
public education expenditure rule, x = X(k; h), and P : <++  <++ ! <++ is a
public pension expenditure rule, p = P (k; h), such that the following conditions are
satised:
(i) the capital market clears,
(1 + n)k0h0 =

1 + 

(1  T (k; h)) (1  )A (k) h  P (k
0; h0)
A (k0) 1

; (7)
(ii) given k and h, hT (k; h); X(k; h); P (k; h)i = argmax
 (k; h; ; x; p; p0) subject to
p0 = P (k0; h0); the capital market clearing condition in (7), the government budget
constraint,

1 + n
P (k; h) + (1 + n)X(k; h) = T (k; h)(1  )A (k) h;
and the human capital production function, h0 = D(X(k; h))(h)1 ; where 
 is
dened by 
 (k; h; ; x; p; p0)  !V o (k; h; ; p) + (1 + n)V M (k; h; ; k0; h0;  0; p0).
In order to obtain a set of functions in Denition 2, we conjecture the following func-
tions: 
p0 = P  A (k0) h0;
x0 = X  A (k0) h0; (8)
where P (> 0) and X(> 0) are constant parameters. By using this conjecture and the
constraints in Denition 2(ii), we can obtain the political objective function as follows:

 = ! ln
 
A (k) 1

(1 + n)kh+ p
!
(9)
+ f! + (1 + n) (1 + ( + ))g ln

(1  )A (k) h  
1 + n
p  (1 + n)x

+ (1 + n) ( + ) (1  ) ln x;
where the terms unrelated to policy are omitted from the expression. The derivation of
(9) is provided in Appendix A.1.
We solve the problem of maximizing 
. The rst-order conditions with respect to p
and x are
p :
!
A(k) 1

(1 + n)kh+ p
 f! + (1 + n) (1 + ( + ))g

1+n
(1  )A (k) h  
1+n
p  (1 + n)x ;
x :
f! + (1 + n) (1 + ( + ))g (1 + n)
(1  )A (k) h  
1+n
p  (1 + n)x =
(1 + n) ( + ) (1  )
x
:
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A strict inequality holds in the rst condition if p = 0. By using these conditions, we
obtain the following result.
Proposition 1. There is a Markov-perfect political equilibrium distinguished by p > 0
if ! > ; and p = 0 otherwise, where  is dened by
  ! + (1 + n) ( + ) (1  ) + f! + (1 + n) (1 + ( + ))g :
The corresponding policy functions are as follows:
(P (k; h); X(k; h)) =
  
Pp>0A (k)
 h; Xp>0A (k)
 h

if ! > ; 
0; Xp=0A (k)
 h

if !  ;
where
Pp>0  !   
 
1+n
; Xp>0   ( + ) (1  )

; and Xp=0   ( + ) (1  )
2
  ! :
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
To understand the result in Proposition 1, recall the political objective function,

 = !|{z}
(1)
ln
 
A (k) 1

(1 + n)kh+ p
!
+
8><>:!|{z}
(2)
+ (1 + n) (1 + ( + ))| {z }
(3)
9>=>; ln

(1  )A (k) h  
1 + n
p  (1 + n)x

+ (1 + n) ( + ) (1  )| {z }
(4)
lnx: (10)
The function indicates that the political power of the old (!), longevity (), and the
population growth rate (n) a¤ect the provisions of public pensions and education through
the four factors represented by the terms (*1), (*2), (*3), and (*4). The other terms,
including  and n, have no critical impact on political decisions because the e¤ects through
these terms cancel each other out.
The term (*1) implies that greater political power of the old and greater longevity
imply a larger weight of the utility of consumption for the old. This incentivizes the
government to allocate tax revenue more to public pensions for the old and less to public
education for the young. The term (*2) implies that greater power of the old and greater
longevity signal a larger weight of the olds utility from their childrens disposable income.
To improve this utility, the government cuts the tax burden of the middle-aged population,
thereby resulting in lower levels of public pensions and education.
The term (*3) is the weight of the utility of the middle-aged agents for their consump-
tion. The two factors included in this term,  and n, produce opposite e¤ects on public
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spending. Greater longevity implies a larger weight of the middle-aged agentsutility of
their old-age consumption. This gives the government an incentive to save more for their
old-age consumption by cutting current pension and education expenditures. However, a
lower population growth rate works in the opposite direction because it implies a smaller
weight of the middle-aged agentsutility of their consumption.
Finally, the term (*4) is the weight of the utility of the middle-aged agents from their
old-age consumption, denoted by (1+n)(+). Greater longevity provides an incentive
for the government to increase pension benets for the middle-aged agents in their old age
and to increase the human capital level of their children. The government can realize these
two purposes by shifting the allocation of tax revenue from pensions for the old to public
education for the children. This shift expands the tax base in the future by improving
human capital of the children, and thus, increases pension benets for the middle-aged
agents in their old age. A lower population growth rate works in the opposite direction
because the weight (1 + n)( + ) decreases as the population growth rate decreases.
Based on the argument thus far, we now consider how the condition for p > 0; given
by ! > ; is a¤ected by the three aging factors, !; ; and n. The condition is rewritten
as follows:
1  

 !|{z}
(1)
> (1 + n) ( + ) (1  )| {z }
(4)
+
8><>:!|{z}
(2)
+ (1 + n) (1 + ( + ))| {z }
(3)
9>=>; ;
where the terms (*1), (*2), (*3), and (*4) correspond to those in the political objective
function. The condition states that the e¤ect of the population growth rate is straight-
forward. The terms (*3) and (*4), including n, indicate that public pensions are more
likely to be provided in political equilibrium if the population growth rate is lower. A
lower population growth rate implies smaller weights to the utility of the middle-aged
agents for their old-age consumption and to the utility of these agents for the disposable
income of their children. Given a lower weight for the utility of the middle-aged agents,
the government shifts its spending from education to pensions for the current old.
The e¤ects of longevity () and the political power of the old (!) on pension provision
are not straightforward. First, greater longevity has a positive e¤ect on pensions through
the term (*1), while it has a negative e¤ect on pensions through the terms (*2), (*3),
and (*4). Second, greater political power of the old has a positive e¤ect on pensions
through the term (*1), while it has a negative e¤ect on pensions through the term (*2).
Greater longevity and greater political power of the old have two competing e¤ects on
pensions, but the condition implies that the public pensions are more likely to be provided
in political equilibrium as longevity and the political power of the old increase.
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4 Pensions and Education
The result established in Section 3 indicates that pensions and education are a¤ected by
the three aging factors, , !, and n. To consider their e¤ects on pensions and education,
we focus on the pension-to-GDP ratio, Nt 1pt=Yt, and the education-to-GDP ratio,
Nt+1xt=Yt, and analyze the e¤ects of increases in  and ! and a decrease in n on these
ratios.
The following proposition demonstrates the e¤ects of ; !; and n on the pension-to-
GDP ratio.
Proposition 2. Suppose that ! >  holds: a Markov-perfect political equilibrium
exists with p > 0. The pension-to-GDP ratio, Nt 1pt=Yt, increases with greater longevity,
greater political power of the old, and a lower population growth rate: @ (Nt 1pt=Yt) =@ >
0; @ (Nt 1pt=Yt) =@! > 0; and @ (Nt 1pt=Yt) =@n < 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
To conrm the statement in Proposition 2, we compute the pension-to-GDP ratio as
follows:
Nt 1pt
Yt
=
26641 + 1!|{z}
(1)

8><>:(1 + n)( + )(1  )| {z }
(4)
+
0B@!|{z}
(2)
+ (1 + n)(1 + ( + ))| {z }
(3)
1CA
9>=>;
3775
 1
 :
(11)
The derivation of Eq. (11) is given in Appendix A.3.
The terms (*1), (*2), (*3), and (*4) in the above expression correspond to those in the
political objective function in Eq. (10). We can apply the interpretation for the condition
of p > 0 to the result in Proposition 2 in the following way. First, the population growth
rate has an e¤ect on the ratio through the terms (*3) and (*4). As described in Section 3,
both terms imply a positive e¤ect on pension provision when the population growth rate
decreases. Second, the political power of the old has two competing e¤ects on the ratio
through the terms (*1) and (*2); and longevity also has two competing e¤ects on the ratio
through the terms (*1), (*2), (*3), and (*4). However, when p > 0, the positive e¤ect
outweighs the negative e¤ect, as demonstrated in Section 3. Therefore, greater longevity
and greater political power of the old lead to a higher pension-to-GDP ratio.
Given the result in Proposition 2 and the government budgetary constraint, it is
natural to conjecture that the education-to-GDP ratio, Nt+1xt=Yt, decreases as  and !
increase and as n decreases. The following proposition shows that the conjecture is true
with regard to ! and n, but it is not necessarily true with regard to .
Proposition 3. The education-to-GDP ratio decreases with greater political power of
the old and a lower population growth rate: @ (Nt+1xt=Yt) =@! < 0 and @ (Nt+1xt=Yt) =@n >
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0. With greater longevity, the education-to-GDP ratio decreases if 1+n  !()2; increases
if !(1 + )  1 + n, and shows a hump-shaped pattern if !()2 < 1 + n < !(1 + ).
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
To conrm the statement in Proposition 3, we rst compute the Nt+1xt=Yt ratio when
p > 0 and p = 0, as follows:
Nt+1xt
Yt

p>0
=
266666664
1 +
(1)z}|{
! +
8<:
(2)z}|{
! +
(3)z }| {
(1 + n) (1 + ( + ))
9=;
(1 + n)( + )(1  )| {z }
(4)
377777775
 1
;
Nt+1xt
Yt

p=0
= (1  ) 
266641 +
(2)z}|{
! +
(3)z }| {
(1 + n) (1 + ( + ))
(1 + n)( + )(1  )| {z }
(4)
37775
 1
:
The terms (*1), (*2), (*3), and (*4) in the expressions correspond to those in the political
objective function in Eq. (10).
The e¤ects of the political power of the old (!) are as follows. Greater political power
of the old has a negative e¤ect on education spending via the term (*1), representing the
weight on the utility of old agents for their consumption, and the term (*2), representing
the weight on the utility of old agents from the disposable income of their children. These
terms give the government incentive to shift the allocation of tax revenue from education
to pensions and to cut the tax burden of the children of old agents. Therefore, the
education-to-GDP ratio decreases as the political power of the old increases.
A lower population growth rate has two competing e¤ects on the education-to-GDP
ratio. The positive e¤ect comes from the term (*3), implying a smaller weight on the
utility of middle-aged agents for their consumption, whereas the negative e¤ect comes
from the term (*4), implying a smaller weight on the utility of the middle-aged agents
from the disposable income of their children. The result suggests that for both cases of
p > 0 and p = 0, the negative e¤ect outweighs the positive one. Therefore, a decrease in
the population growth rate results in a decline in the education-to-GDP ratio.
Greater longevity a¤ects the ratio in the following ways. The rst e¤ect involves
the term (*4), representing the weight of the utility of the middle-aged agents from the
disposable income of their children. When longevity increases, the government shifts the
allocation of tax revenue from pensions to education in order to increase the income of the
children. This positive e¤ect is o¤set partly by the negative e¤ect of longevity represented
by the term (*3). This term works to decrease the tax burden of the middle-aged agents
by cutting the expenditure on education.
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There are two additional negative e¤ects of longevity on public education; they are
represented by the terms (*1) and (*2). These e¤ects are enhanced as the political power
of the old increases. That is, the sum of the negative e¤ects by the terms (*1), (*2), and
(*3) outweighs the positive e¤ect by the term (*4) when the political power of the old is
above a critical level. However, we should note that the e¤ect via the term (*1) appears
only when p > 0. Therefore, the critical values of political power that balance the two
competing e¤ects di¤er between the two cases, p > 0 and p = 0: This di¤erence is a source
of the hump-shaped pattern of the education-to-GDP ratio.
[Figure 2 here.]
Figure 2 illustrates a numerical example of the hump-shaped pattern. We x the share
of capital at  = 1=3, following Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2012) and Lancia and
Russo (2015). Each period lasts 30 years; this assumption is standard in quantitative
analyses of the two-period overlapping-generations model (see, for example, Gonzalez-
Eiras and Niepelt, 2008; Lancia and Russo, 2015). The middle-age period is from 30 to
59 years old, while the old-age period is from 60 to 89 years old. Following Lancia and
Russo (2015), we assume an annual gross population growth rate of 1:006; which is the
OECD average rate during 1995 2009: This assumption implies that the gross population
growth rate for 30 years is (1:006)30 ' 1:197:
Following the literature (Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt, 2008; Lancia and Russo, 2015),
the political power of the elderly, denoted by !, is set equal to the per-capita inuence of
the middle-aged and the elderly. We set ! = 2:3 to indicate that the middle-aged and the
elderly have approximately the same per-capita inuence when  = 0:52; that is, when
individuals live for 74:6 years on average. The remaining two parameters,  and , are
set at  = 0:61 and  = 0:259, respectively, to satisfy the following two requirements: (i)
the education-to-GDP ratio is around 5:4%, which is the OECD average for 1995-2009
(Lancia and Russo, 2015), and (ii) the condition of ! ()2 < 1 + n < !(1 + ) has a
hump-shaped pattern in the education-to-GDP ratio in the present framework.
5 Economic Growth
Based on the result established thus far, we derive the growth rate of the economy, and
investigate how it is a¤ected by population aging. For the presentation of the analysis,
consider per capita output, yt, which is dened by yt  Yt=Nt = A(kt)ht: Then, the
growth rate of per capita output is
y0
y
=
A(k0)h0
A(k)h
;
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where x0 denotes the next period x(= k; h; y). In the steady state with k0 = k, the
growth rate of per capita output, y0=y, is equal to the growth rate of human capital, h0=h.
Therefore, in what follows, we focus on the steady-state growth rate of human capital.
The analysis proceeds as follows. First, we consider the cases of p > 0 and p = 0,
separately. We show that the physical-to-human capital ratio, k = K=H, stably converges
to a unique steady state for each case, and that at the steady state, the growth rate of
human capital remains constant across periods. Second, we undertake numerical analysis
to investigate the overall e¤ects of increases in ! and  and a decrease in n on the growth
rate at the steady state.
5.1 Steady-state Growth Rate
Recall the capital market-clearing condition in Denition 2. With the use of the policy
functions derived in Proposition 1, we reformulate it as follows:
k0 =  k
 
P
  (1  )A (k) h  
1 + n
p  (1 + n)x

(x)  (h) (1 ) ; (12)
where
 k
 
P
  1+
D
n
(1 + n) + 
1+
 P

o :
The term  k () is constant and dependent on P , where P is the coe¢ cient of the policy
function, p = P  A(k)h, and is presented in Proposition 1. The derivation of these
equations and the denition of  k () are provided in Appendix A.1.
Suppose that p > 0. The policy functions are given by
P (k; h) = Pp>0  A (k) h;
X(k; h) = Xp>0  A (k) h:
Substituting these functions into the physical capital formation function in (12), we obtain
the law of motion of physical capital when p > 0, as follows:
k0 =  k
 
Pp>0
(1  )  
1 + n
Pp>0   (1 + n) Xp>0

  Xp>0  (A)(1 )(k)(1 ) : (13)
The equation implies that a unique and non-trivial steady state exists and that for any
initial condition k > 0, the sequence of k stably converges to the unique steady state.
From (13), we compute the steady-state level of k when p > 0, denoted by kp>0, as follows:
kp>0 =
"
 k
 
Pp>0
 (1  )  
1 + n
Pp>0   (1 + n) Xp>0
1 
   Xp>0   (A)(1 )#1=f1 (1 )g :
(14)
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Using kp>0 in (14) and the policy functions in Proposition 1, we write the law of motion
of human capital when p > 0 as h0jp>0 = D 
 
Xp>0A
 
kp>0

h
  (h)1  ; or
h0
h

p>0
= D    Xp>0A  kp>0 : (15)
The equation shows that the growth rate is constant across periods at the steady state.
Following the same procedure, we obtain the growth rate when p = 0 as follows:
h0
h

p=0
= D    Xp=0A  kp=0 ; (16)
where kp=0 is a unique and stable steady-state level of k when p = 0.
5.2 Numerical Analysis
To investigate the growth e¤ect of increases in ! and  and a decrease in n, we undertake
numerical analysis. We follow the assumption introduced in Section 4: each generation
lasts for 30 years; the population growth rate for 30 years is (1:006)30   1 ' 0:197; and
 = 1=3,  = 0:61; and  = 0:259: In addition, we normalize A as A = 1, and set D = 2:77
to obtain an empirically plausible result of the growth rates.
Within these assumptions, we undertake the numerical analysis and obtain the follow-
ing results, as illustrated in Figure 3. First, an increase in ! leads to a decrease in the
growth rate, as depicted in Panel (a). Second, a decrease in n leads to an increase in the
growth rate, as depicted in Panel (b). Third, an increase in  leads to a hump-shaped
pattern when !()2 < 1 + n < !(1 + ), as depicted in Panel (c). Therefore, the three
parameters, !; , and n, representing population aging, have di¤erent e¤ects on economic
growth.
[Figure 3 here.]
To understand the mechanism behind the result, recall the growth rate of human
capital in Eqs. (15) and (16). The growth rate is a¤ected by !; , and n through the two
factors, that is, the policy function of public education represented by Xp>0 and Xp=0,
and the steady-state capital, represented by kp>0 and kp=0. The rst factor is crucial in
determining the growth rate because parameters related to population aging, !; , and n;
directly a¤ect the growth rate via the term Xp>0 or Xp=0. Therefore, hereafter, we focus
on Xp>0 and Xp=0 to interpret the result.
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Recall Xp>0 and Xp=0 in Proposition 1, which are reformulated as follows:
Xp>0 =
 ( + ) (1  )

=
(4a)z }| {
 ( + ) (1  )
!|{z}
(1)
+ (1 + n)| {z }
(4b)
+ !|{z}
(2)
+ (1 + n)(1 + ( + ))| {z }
(3)
;
Xp=0 =
 ( + ) (1  )2
  ! =
(4a)z }| {
 ( + ) (1  )2
(1 + n)| {z }
(4b)
+ !|{z}
(2)
+ (1 + n)(1 + ( + ))| {z }
(3)
;
where the terms (*1), (*2), and (*3) correspond to those in the political objective function
in Eq. (10), and the terms (*4a) and (*4b) correspond to the term (*4) in Eq. (10). The
terms (*1) and (*2) show a negative e¤ect of increased political power of the old on
education spending, and thus, on the growth rate of human capital; the terms (*3) and
(*4b) show a positive e¤ect of a decreased population growth rate on education spending
and the growth rate of human capital. Therefore, the e¤ect on the growth rate is denite
when ! and n.2
The e¤ect of  on the growth rate is not straightforward. The terms (*1), (*2), and
(*3) show a negative e¤ect of longevity on education spending, and thus, on economic
growth, while the term (*4a) shows a positive e¤ect. However, the negative e¤ect via
the term (*1) appears only when the public pension is provided, because the term (*1)
is irrelevant for political decision making when there is no provision of public pension.
That is, the negative e¤ect of  when p > 0 is larger than that when p = 0. Because
of this di¤erence, the negative e¤ect outweighs the positive e¤ect when p > 0, while the
negative e¤ect is outweighed by the positive e¤ect when p = 0. This is the source of the
hump-shaped pattern of the growth rate a¤ected by longevity.
6 Role of Annuity Markets
The analysis thus far has assumed perfect annuity markets. However, in the real world,
some countries have limited or no access to annuity markets. We expect this to inuence
individual economic and political decisions, which in turn a¤ect long-run economic growth.
To explore this possibility, this section modies the model by assuming no annuity market,
and investigates how the results di¤er in this alternative scenario.
2We should note that a lower population growth rate results in a lower aggregate education spending-
to-GDP ratio, as demonstrated in Section 4, whereas it results in larger per capita spending on education,
as demonstrated here. The di¤erence arises because Xp>0 (or Xp=0) is multiplied by the gross population
growth rate, 1 + n, when we compute the aggregate education spending. The factor 1 + n works in a
negative direction and outweighs the positive e¤ect through Xp>0 (or Xp=0).
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For this purpose, we demonstrate the no-annuity-market case in the following way.
The budget constraints of the middle-aged and the elderly are now given by
ct + st  (1  t)wtht + bt;
dt+1  Rt+1st + pt+1;
where bt is the per capita accidental bequest. If an individual dies at the end of middle
age, his/her unannuitized wealth, Nt(1   )Rt+1st; is distributed to his/her o¤spring as
an accidental bequest: Nt+1bt+1 = Nt(1  )Rt+1st; or
bt+1 =
1  
1 + n
Rt+1st: (17)
We solve the utility maximization problem with the above budget constraints and
obtain the saving and consumption functions. Then we substitute these, the government
budget constraints, and (17) into the utility function of the middle-aged, and make a
conjecture related to the policy functions as in Section 3 to obtain the following indirect
utility function for the middle-aged:
V M = f1 + ( + )g ln

(1  )A (k) h+ (1  )A (k) h  
1 + n
p  (1 + n)x

+  ( + ) (1  ) ln x;
where the term (1 )A (k) h peculiar to the modied model represents the accidental
bequest. The indirect utility function of the elderly is also obtained as
V o = ln [(1 + n)A (k) h+ p] +  ln

(1  )A (k) h  
1 + n
p  (1 + n)x

:
Following the same procedure as in the previous sections, we seek the policy functions
that maximize the political objective, 
 = !V o+(1+n)V M : However, we are unable to
obtain analytical solutions of the policy functions because of the presence of the additional
term (1   )A (k) h. To resolve this di¢ culty, we solve the maximization problem
numerically. We adopt the parameter values introduced in the previous sections, and use
the numerically obtained policy functions to compute the steady-state level of capital and
the rate of per capita human capital growth. Figure 4 illustrates how longevity a¤ects
the pension-to-GDP ratio and the steady-state growth rate.
[Figure 4 here.]
The gure shows that the no annuity market case di¤ers from the case with perfect
annuity markets in three respects. First, public pensions are provided for any probability
of living to old age,  2 [0; 1]. No annuity markets implies a lower return from savings
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than when there are perfect annuity markets. This strengthens the elderly populations
incentives to expand public pension provision. Second, the pension-to-GDP ratio exhibits
a hump-shaped pattern as longevity increases. Children receive a smaller bequest as
parents longevity increases, implying a negative income e¤ect that gives the middle-
aaged an incentive to prefer a smaller tax burden and thus a lower level of public pension
provision. This negative e¤ect on pension dominates the positive e¤ect demonstrated in
Proposition 2 when longevity is above a threshold level. Third, the negative e¤ect on
pensions incentivizes individuals to save more for the retirement period. This leads to
an increase in the steady-state level of capital. This positive e¤ect on capital dominates
the negative growth e¤ect through the policy function of public education presented in
Section 5.
The result in this section indicates that the presence (or absence) of annuity markets
is a key to the e¤ect of longevity on economic growth. As demonstrated in the previous
section, an increase in longevity could reduce the growth rate when individuals are able
to purchase private annuity contracts. However, the result in this section shows that
rising longevity denitely increases the growth rate when private annuity contracts are
unavailable. To check the empirical relevance of the conicting predictions, we again look
at the observation in Panel (c) of Figure 1. In particular, we focus on four countries
with a high proportion of the population aged 65 years and above: the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, and the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom has GDP per capita
growth below 5%, while the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Hungary have growth rates
above 10%. There is a signicant di¤erence in the growth rates among these countries,
although they share a similar demographic structure.
The divergence between the United Kingdom and the three Eastern European coun-
tries could be explained by the degree of private annuitization. In fact, the OECD (2014,
Factbook) reports that the ratio of private expenditure on pension to GDP, which cap-
tures the degree of private annuitization, was 1.6% in 2010 for the United Kingdom. This
is above the OECD average of 0.9%. On the other hand, the ratio was 0.5% for the
Czech Republic, 0% for Estonia, and 0.2% for Hungary. These gures are stable for 2007-
2012. Therefore, we may well conclude that the overall trend in OECD countries shows
a non-linear relationship between longevity and economic growth, though some countries
experience continued economic growth due to limited access to private annuities.3
3Japan also exhibits a high share of population aged 65 years and above, though is not included in
the discussion above because of the lack of data related to private annuitization.
19
7 Summary and Conclusion
How does the conict of interest between generations a¤ect the two redistribution policies,
namely, public education for the young and public pensions for the old? In turn, how
does the conict a¤ect economic growth? The present study attempted to answer these
questions from a political economy viewpoint.
We considered three factors representing population aging: longevity, the political
power of the old, and the population growth rate. We showed that with greater political
power of the old and a lower population growth rate, the pension-to-GDP ratio increases
but the education-to-GDP ratio decreases. In addition, greater longevity results in a
higher pension-to-GDP ratio.
We demonstrated that the e¤ect of longevity on education spending is complex.
Greater longevity increases the weight of the utility of the elderly. This incentivizes the
government to shift spending allocations from education to pensions. However, greater
longevity also increases the weight of middle-aged agents utility from their childrens
human capital. This gives the government an incentive to increase public education
spending. These opposing e¤ects produce an initial increase followed by a decrease in the
education-to-GDP ratio, which in turn results in a hump-shaped pattern in the growth
rate. This model prediction generally ts the cross-country empirical evidence in devel-
oped countries. We also demonstrated that greater longevity always increases the growth
rate when there is no private annuity market, and found that this result ts the data from
some Eastern European countries with limited access to private pensions.
The result established in the present study have policy implications related to aging
and economic growth. First, a decline in the population growth rate and an increase in
longevity have di¤erent e¤ects on economic growth. In particular, a decline in the pop-
ulation growth rate denitely increases per-capita growth, while an increase in longevity
has a non-monotone growth e¤ect. Therefore, policymakers should focus on increasing
life expectancy and its associated costs rather than falling birth rates. Second, diminish-
ing the political power of the elderly can increase economic growth. One way to realize
this is to lower the minimum voting age. Japan, with the highest life expectancy among
developed countries, has recently lowered the minimum voting age from 20 to 18. This
is expected to strengthen the political power of the young, and to increase the economic
growth rate in the long run.
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A Proofs
A.1 Derivation of (9)
To derive (9), we rst use the government budget constraint to replace  in the indirect
utility functions by x and p. Then, we substitute the conjectures in (8) into the political
objective function 
. Finally, we replace k0 and h0 with k; h; x and p, respectively, by
using the capital market clearing condition and the human capital production function.
In what follows, we provide the details of the calculation step by step.
Step 1.
Recall the government budget constraint in Denition 2(ii), which is rewritten as
follows:
1   = (1  )A (k)
 h  
1+n
p  (1 + n)x
(1  )A (k) h :
Plugging this into the indirect utility functions in (5) and (6), we obtain
V M = ln
1
1 + 

(1  )A (k) h  
1 + n
p  (1 + n)x+ p
0
A (k0) 1

+  ln
 
A (k0) 1

(1 + n)k0h0 + p0
!
+  ln

(1  )A (k0) h0   
1 + n
p0   (1 + n)x0

;
V o = ln
 
A (k) 1

(1 + n)kh+ p
!
+  ln

(1  )A (k) h  
1 + n
p  (1 + n)x

:
(18)
Step 2.
We substitute the conjecture of the policy functions in (8) into V M to obtain
V M = ln
1
1 + 

(1  )A (k) h  
1 + n
p  (1 + n)x+ 
PA (k0) h0
A (k0) 1

+  ln
 
A (k0) 1

(1 + n)k0h0 + PA (k0) h0
!
+  ln

(1  )A (k0) h0   
1 + n
PA (k0) h0   (1 + n) XA (k0) h0

= ln

(1  )A (k) h  
1 + n
p  (1 + n)x+ 

Pk0h0

+  ( + ) ln k0 + ( + ) lnh0;
(19)
where the terms unrelated to the political decision are omitted from the expression.
Step 3.
To replace k0 and h0 in (19) with k; h; p and x; we rst recall the human capital
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production function, h0 = D (x) (h)1 ; and the capital market clearing condition,
(1 + n)k0h0 =

1 + 

(1  )wh  p
0
R0

=

1 + 

(1  )A (k) h  
1 + n
p  (1 + n)x 
PA (k0) h0
A (k0) 1

;
where the rst line comes from the capital market clearing condition, (1+n)k0h0 = s with
the saving function in (1), and the second line comes from the prot maximization condi-
tions in (3) and (4) and the conjecture of the policy function p0 in (8). After rearranging
the terms, we rewrite the abovementioned expression as follows:
k0h0 =

1+
(1 + n) + 
1+
 P



(1  )A (k) h  
1 + n
p  (1 + n)x

: (20)
We substitute h0 = D (x) (h)1  into (20) to obtain
k0 =  k
 
P
  (1  )A (k) h  
1 + n
p  (1 + n)x

 (x)   (h) (1 ) ; (21)
where  k
 
P

is dened by:
 k
 
P
  1+
D
n
(1 + n) + 
1+
 P

o :
By using (20) and (21), we rewrite V M in (19) as
V M = f1 + ( + )g ln

(1  )A (k) h  
1 + n
p  (1 + n)x

+  ( + ) (1  ) ln x; (22)
where constant terms are omitted from the expression. With V o in (18) and V M in (22),
we write the political objective function 
 = !V o + (1 + n)V M as expressed in (9).

A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose that public pensions are provided in the next period, p0 > 0. Given that prefer-
ences are specied by the logarithmic utility function, we conjecture linear policy functions
of public education and public pensions for the next period, x0 = Xp>0  A (k0) h0 and
p0 = Pp>0  A (k0) h0; respectively, where Xp>0(> 0) and Pp>0(> 0) are policy function
parameters when p > 0. Under this conjecture, the solution to the problem becomes:
X(k; h) =


( + ) (1  )A (k) h;
P (k; h) =
!   
 
1+n
A (k) h;
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where  is dened in Proposition 1. The solution for P (k; h) indicates that P (k; h) > 0
holds if and only if ! > . When ! >  holds, the abovementioned solution
constitutes a Markov-perfect political equilibrium if(
Xp>0  ( + ) (1  ) ;
Pp>0  !  
1+n
:
(23)
Alternatively, suppose that p0 = 0; that is, public pensions are not provided in the
next period. Consider the estimation of policy functions as x0 = Xp=0  A (k0) h0 and
p0 = Pp=0  A (k0) h0, where Xp=0 and Pp=0 are policy function parameters when p = 0.
The solution to the problem becomes:
X(k; h) =
( + ) (1  )2
  ! A (k)
 h;
P (k; h) = 0 if !  :
This solution constitutes a Markov-perfect political equilibrium if
Xp=0  ( + ) (1  )
2
  ! and
Pp=0  0. (24)
The tax rates for p > 0 and p = 0 are obtained by substituting the corresponding
policy functions X and P into the government budget constraint.

A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The pension-to-GDP ratio is
Nt 1pt
Yt
=
Nt 1pt
ytNt
=

A(kt)ht (1 + n)
 (!   )
 
1+n
 A(kt)ht = 1
=!
  ;
where the rst equality comes from yt = Yt=Nt and the second equality comes from the
policy function of pt presented in Proposition 1. Using the denition of  in Proposition
1, we rewrite this expression as
Nt 1pt
Yt
=
1
1 + 1
!
 [(1 + n)( + ) (1  ) + f! + (1 + n)(1 + ( + ))g]   ;
that is,
Nt 1pt
Yt
=
1
1 + (1 + n) 
!
 
1 + 


(1  ) +  + (1 + n) 1
!
 
1

+
 
1 + 



   :
This equation states that Nt 1pt=Yt is increasing in  and ! and is decreasing in n.

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A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Let Nt+1xt=Ytjp>0 and Nt+1xt=Ytjp=0 denote the public education-to-GDP ratio when
p > 0 and p = 0, respectively. Using the policy function of xt in Proposition 1, they are
expressed as follows:
Nt+1xt
Yt

p>0
= (1 + n) Xp>0 =
1
1 +  p>0
;
Nt+1xt
Yt

p=0
= (1 + n) Xp=0 =
1
1 +  p=0
;
where
 p>0  ! + f! + (1 + n) (1 + ( + ))g
(1 + n)( + )(1  ) ;
 p=0  ! + (1 + n) (1 + ( + ))
(1 + n)( + )(1  ) :
The terms  p>0 and  p=0 are increasing in ! and decreasing in n. Therefore, the ratio
decreases as ! increases and as n decreases for both cases of p > 0 and p = 0.
To determine the e¤ect of  on the ratio, we di¤erentiate  p>0 and  p=0 with respect
to  and obtain
@ p>0
@
=
1
(1 + n)( + )2(1  )  [!(1 + )   (1 + n)] ;
@ p=0
@
=
1
(1 + n)( + )2(1  ) 

!()2   (1 + n) :
These expressions indicate that the following holds:
@
 
Nt+1xt
Yt

p>0
!
=@  0 and @
 
Nt+1xt
Yt

p=0
!
=@ > 0 if !(1 + )  (1 + n);
@
 
Nt+1xt
Yt

p>0
!
=@ < 0 and @
 
Nt+1xt
Yt

p=0
!
=@ > 0 if !()2 < (1 + n) < !(1 + );
@
 
Nt+1xt
Yt

p>0
!
=@ < 0 and @
 
Nt+1xt
Yt

p=0
!
=@  0 if (1 + n)  !()2:

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Figure 1: Panel (a): public pension spending-to-GDP ratio and population aged 65 years
and above, 2005{2009. Panel (b): public education spending-to-GDP ratio and population
aged 65 years and above, 2000{2010. Panel (c): per capita growth rate and population
aged 65 years and above. Source: World Bank, 2015, World Bank Indicators; OECD, so-
cial expenditure database (https://data.oecd.org/socialexp/pension-spending.htm, July
11, 2015).
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Figure 2: Education spending-to-GDP ratio and the longevity parameter .
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Figure 3: Panel (a): per capita human capital growth rate and !. Panel (b): per capita
human capital growth rate and n. Panel (c): per capita human capital growth rate and
.
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Figure 4: Panel (a): public pension-to-GDP ratio and . Panel (b): per capita human
capital growth rate and .
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